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This paper investigates the behaviour of a Citizen-Candidate Model in a simple
framework with many large constituencies, many policy dimensions, and endogenous
coalition formation. A model is simulated in which districts elect representatives who
themselves interact to form parties. Competition between parties of dierent sizes
and with dierent platforms is an emergent property of the model which leads to
stable equilibria. The results demonstrate how the number of policy dimensions and
representatives elected per electoral district inuence the number, size, and relative
locations of parties and consequently the possible equilibria. These results are obtained
using a new algorithm for identifying and comparing equilibria found by simulation.
Comparison with election data shows strong correspondence between the model's
results and observed outcomes, including variation consistent with a form of Duverger's
law.
Email: Ladley-dl110@le.ac.uk, Rockey-jcr12@le.ac.uk1 Introduction
A key feature of most modern representative democracies is that political competition
is dominated by political parties. These parties vary a great deal - some are small and
ideologically cohesive, others large collections of politicians with quite dierent views.
Moreover, the size-distribution of parties varies meaningfully across democracies. The
United States for most of its history has been dominated by two large parties whereas many
European democracies have many parties of dierent sizes. This variation is important, in
part because the set of possible governing coalitions and hence policy outcomes is contingent
on the size-distribution of parties. As such, one might ask why do we observe this variation,
and how does this variation depend on particular national characteristics?
Both of these questions have been the focus of much scholarly attention, but the approach
of this paper is dierent to most previous work. There are three key characteristics of the
model. Firstly, political parties are simply voluntary coalitions of elected politicians formed
for mutual (electoral) benet.1 Secondly, a key feature of politics, in practice, is that not
only are politicians themselves heterogenous but so are the electoral districts they represent,
something which we also model explicitly. Finally, both the elected and their electors may have
multidimensional preferences, that is any two of them may agree on some issues but disagree
profoundly, on another, unrelated, issue. These features as well as the endogenous formation of
parties means analysis of this model would be challenging analytically. The approach taken in-
stead is to solve a dynamic computational analogue of the citizen-candidate model, of Osborne
and Slivinski (1996) (henceforth OS) and Besley and Coate (1997) (henceforth BC), incorporat-
ing these three features and in which politicians may or may not form or join political parties.
To understand the variation in party size and the structure of party systems, two related
questions are asked. Firstly, how does the form and the number of equilibria of the model
vary with electoral system? The results are both intuitively sensible and empirically realistic.
The second question is how does the number of policy dimensions aect outcomes, and
evidence is provided, consistent with the results of Levy (2004), that moving from one to
1In reality, political parties may perform other important roles. These are not studied here, partly
because of pronounced national dierences in the other functions of parties.
2multiple policy dimensions gives rise to more scope for agreement between politicians with
dierent preferences. That is, that preferences in two or more dimensions are associated
with fewer, but larger parties.
The second part of the paper studies how party structure depends on the electoral system.
There are many reasons for variation in party structure, but a key source of variation is the
proportionality of the electoral system.2 A specic version of this claim is often referred to as
Duverger's Law, which may be stated as `elections using a plurality rule give rise to two party
systems'. The results indeed nd support for Duverger's law, and using data on post-1945
elections evidence is provided for a great deal of similarity between the size-distribution
of parties predicted by the model, and observed outcomes.
2 Previous Literature
The version of the citizen-candidate model we study incorporates aspects of both those of OS
and BC. The two papers have dierent intentions, a key focus of OS is the eects of dierent
electoral systems. BC consider the more general question of the existence of equilibria with
endogenous candidacy. An important dierence in the models is that OS assume a continuum
of sincere voters whilst BC model a nite number of strategic voters. Like the latter we model
a (large) nite number of citizens, however voting is sincere as in OS.3 The general form of
BC's model doesn't assume a particular number of policy dimensions, or Euclidean preferences.
There are, however, other fairly restrictive assumptions, and focuses largely on the existence
of at least one equilibrium rather than the precise number or form. Although, the papers
have dierent emphases and apply their models to dierent questions it is straightforward
to identify the key similarities and dierences between them. These two papers share a
framework in which politicians emerge endogenously from the population of voters, they also
both assume that politicians are unable to credibly commit to a policy dierent to the one
2Other sources of variation include further dierences in the form of the electoral system, or specic
electorates' preferences, for example, several countries, such as Canada, Spain and the UK, have well
established minority parties associated with minority linguistic, national, or cultural groups.
3This assumption is important since as OS model the population as a continuum, sincere voting is
amongst the strategic equilibria. This result hinges on the zero measure and hence the inuence of individual
voters, and is therefore not true for the nite population we model, even as the population becomes large.
3they prefer. These assumptions of endogenous candidates and a lack of credible commitment
have been characteristic of much of the subsequent literature, as has the distinction between
sincere and strategic voters. It is useful to briey consider more recent developments on this
latter distinction, before moving to the issues of credible commitment, and political parties.
The motivation of Morelli (2004) would seem similar to that of this paper. Morelli's specic
objective is to provide a framework where the `Duvergian predictions can be studied even
when the electorate is divided into multiple districts and candidates and parties are separate
entities.' He nds support for the Duvergian hypothesis, that plurality electoral systems lead
to two party systems, and his setup incorporates what he claims are the necessary features of
`strategic voters, strategic parties, and strategic candidates, within and across districts'. As will
be discussed below, in his model political parties provide a means of coordinating voters within
and between districts as well as a method by which coalitions of heterogeneous candidates can
commit to a shared policy-platform. However, Morelli (2004)'s emphasis on strategic agents
whilst conceptually dierent to our approach may matter little in practice. Dutta, Jackson and
Breton (2001) show that outcome of all democratic voting procedures depend on the candidacy
decision of those who don't (cannot) win the election in question. One of the most important
contributions of Morelli (2004) is that often, but not always, with endogenous candidacy
equilibrium rational (strategic) voting behaviour is sincere.4 But, crucially, Morelli shows that
\the equilibrium policy outcome is not aected by whether voters are expected to be sincere
or strategic. Thus, the sincere vs. strategic voting issue is irrelevant for welfare analysis."
Political parties have many roles in a democracy, and a variety of these have been modelled.
These are surveyed by Merlo (2006) and Dhillon (2005) include parties as representing
specic constituencies or groups (e.g. Snyder and Ting (2002) or Roemer (1999)) or voter
coordination devices Morelli (2004). In Osborne and Tourky (2008) parties are modelled as a
cost-sharing technology. A key result of their model is that costly voting implies that a single
hegemonic party is never an equilibrium. As they note, this contrasts with the results of
Morelli (2004), where under plurality rule only one-party stands in equilibrium. They consider
4Specically, he shows that under the plurality rule that `equilibrium [strategic] voting behaviour is always
sincere'. But that in a proportional representation system if there is no party with more than half of the
votes there will always be some voters who in equilibrium vote strategically
4the extension of their model to the case of n policy dimensions and suggest that there will be
at most 2n parties. Intuitively, this result is very much only an upper bound on the number of
(eective) parties we should expect as the number of policy-dimensions increases and leaves
the question of how the number of parties varies with the dimensionality of the policy space
largely unanswered. In the model of Levy (2004) parties are devices they allow politicians
to credibly campaign on a platform known not to correspond to their most-favoured as party
membership provides a complete contracting mechanism.56 In the model below, this role
of political parties emerges endogenously - candidates seeking re-election often stand with
platforms (which would be implemented if their party were to win the election), dierent
from their preferred policy if this changes the implemented policy suciently in their favour.
There is a small computational literature which analyzes political parties and their be-
haviour. The rst paper of which we are aware to apply a computational approach to voting is
that of Tullock and Campbell (1970) who analyzed computationally the problem of cyclical ma-
jorities in small committees with multi-dimensional preferences. They found that the impact
of additional preference dimensions beyond two was small. Although our setting is dierent,
the results of our model suggest similarly that the key dierence is between having one or more
than one dimension. A key early contribution was that of Kollman, Miller and Page (1992) who
in contrast to much of the previous rational choice literature, studied the behaviour of bound-
edly rational parties. They argued that the, sometimes incomplete, platform convergence
predicted by analytic models was robust to non-fully rational parties. This type of question,
involving understanding the behaviour of a large number of boundedly rational agents clearly
lends itself to simulation-based approaches. Many of the results of this paper are obtained by
simulating our model many times, and analyzing the distribution of results. Our approach is
5When this role of political parties is important in equilibrium varies depending on the context. In
the model of Levy (2004) the commitment device provided by political parties is unimportant with one
policy dimension but allows for stable equilibria to exist in the case of multiple policy dimensions which
wouldn't otherwise be possible.In Morelli (2004) the commitment technology allows parties comprised of
candidates with dierent preferred policies to stand, but in his setting it is rarely important.
6There is a venerable literature that studies the case when politicians are only concerned by oce, and
as such can credibly commit to any policy position, that began with Downs (1957). An alternative literature
building on the work of Wittman (1977) considered politicians motivated by ideology or policy who as such
can only credibly commit to their preferred policy. Alesina (1988) analyzed the case when politicians care
about both winning and the policy they then implement. Emphasizing that the tension between the two
gave rise to a dynamic-inconsistency problem because in a one-period game voters cannot control politicians
once they have been elected, i.e. there is an incomplete-contract problem.
5therefore similar to that of Kollman, Miller and Page (1997) who study a Tiebout type model.
Recent work has studied the dynamics of party behaviour and in particular the interaction
between dierent types of party. Laver (2005) investigates the dynamical properties of a
democratic system. In particular, he shows that the interaction of parties distinguished by
dierent behaviours. Some parties are ideological and as such don't move around the policy
space, others move towards the median voter's preferences, the position of the largest party,
or move randomly repeating moves that were successful. This gives rise to interesting and
realistic party dynamics, without necessarily any stable equilibria. This framework is then
applied to Irish politics where
Starting from expert survey estimates of party and voter positions, and party
decision rules, the model generates time series of individual party sizes, variations
in these, and the cross-sectional variation of sizes between parties that look
similar to published opinion poll series[...].
Laver and Schilperoord (2007) extend this analysis by endogenizing the birth and death of
political parties. In this model, parties that fail to obtain a certain vote share `die'. Parties
are 'born' when citizens are suciently dissatised with the absence of a party sharing their
views that they found one. Parties are often born at the extremes of the policy space and
move to the centre where they often then die. The computational approach of Laver (2005),
Laver and Schilperoord (2007) is very dierent to the one pursued here. Their focus is on
the dynamic properties of competition between parties with pre-specied behavioural rules,
over time. Whilst, the model presented here is also dynamic, the focus is its steady state
and in particular the equilibrium distribution of parties as the type of electoral system and
number of policy dimensions varies. Similarly, whilst both are compared to empirical data,
Laver (2005) use time-series data, whereas we focus on the cross-section.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model, and discusses the
results from simulating a single constituency. Section 4 proceeds to consider the equilibria
reached when many constituency are considered simultaneously. Section 5 compares the
statistical properties of the simulation results to those of a dataset describing results of
elections for a variety of countries since 1945. The Final Section concludes.
63 Model
We consider a discrete time model of repeated elections in which a population of J individuals
are split between D districts. These individuals are assumed to have policy preferences dened
on the N-dimensional unit hypercube, [0;1]N 2 RN. Individual j 2 J has an ideal point within
this space denoted Aj = [aj1;::;ajk;::;ajN] where ajk is their preferred point in dimension k.
Individual j's utility depends on the distance between their preferences and the policy
implemented as a result of the election. We dene:
 j(W   Aj)j =  
N X
k=1
j(wk   ajk)j (1)
where W = [w1;:::;wN] is the implemented policy and the distance between two points
a and b is denoted as ja   bj.
Distances between the implemented policy W and the individual's ideal point Aj are
dened as the `Manhattan' distance.7 This choice represents a desire for the total divergence
to represent the summation of dierences in each dimension. Other norms, would seem to
require further assumptions about how individuals weight dierences across dimensions.8
However, the results presented in this paper are not dependant on this assumption and are
robust to the use of the Euclidean Norm.
The model presented here reects the key feature of the work by OS and BC in that there
is no distinction between politicians and voters: any citizen can choose to stand for oce
in any election. After each election individual j receives utility Uj contingent on whether
they stood and the outcome of the election:
7Properly, the Manhattan distance is an L1 norm.
8For example, in the case of the Euclidean norm its not clear that a divergence of 0:25 in each of two
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 jW   Ajj    +  if she is elected
 jW   Ajj    if she is not elected
 jW   Ajj if she does not stand
(2)
Where  is the cost of standing and  is a rent derived by the citizen from holding oce.9
Individuals determine whether they will stand for election based on past utilities received
from their actions. Specically, we assume that the probability of an individual standing
for election at a particular point in time, t, is given by the ratio of their past utilities from












jt are measures of individual j's utility from running or not
running at time t as dened below. After each election each individual, given an implemented
policy W, calculates URun
j;t+1 and UNoRun
j;t+1 as follows:
Stood For Oce Didn't Stand
URun
j;t+1 URun









j;0 = 1 , P stand
j;0 = 0:5:10 In our model individuals are not able to
observe the counterfactual of what would have happened if they had reversed their standing
9In this model individuals place equal weight on distances in each dimension. It is worth noting, however,
that the results of the model change little if individuals are assumed to vary the weights they assign
to dierent policy dimensions. This complication comes at the price of removing any intuitive spatial
interpretation of the policy space as, for example, the ideological distance from Person 1 to Person 2 will
be perceived dierently by each voter. Accordingly, we do not focus on this aspect.
10The values of UNoRun
j;0 and UNoRun
j;0 have a limited eect on model behaviour, larger values can
dramatically increase the time until convergence and setting either value to be less than or equal to zero
can cause obvious convergence problem.
8decision therefore in line with the work of Rustichini (1999) we adopt a linear learning rule.11
3.1 Elections
In each time step a single election is conducted. In the rst stage of each election all
individuals within each constituency simultaneously declare whether they will stand for oce.
This results in the set Cd
t of standing candidates in each district d. Every individual j within
the population then simultaneously votes for a candidate within their district, d, given by:
argmin
k
j(Ak   Aj)j where k 2 C
d
and j 2 d
: (5)
i.e. individuals vote for the candidate who's ideal point is closest to their own. This implicitly
assumes sincere voting, each individual votes for the candidate who if elected and who's
policy were implemented would maximize their utility.
Votes for each candidate are counted and the m individuals from each district with the
highest number of votes are elected to oce. If jCdj < m all members of Cd are elected,
however, all non-standing members of d receive  N      1 utility for this election. This
large negative utility is of greater magnitude than the lowest utility an individual may receive
if they stand for election and so ensures that once the model has converged there will be
at least m individuals standing for election in each district.12
3.2 Coalition formation
Once elections have taken place in each of the D districts the set of elected representatives
together determine the policy to be implemented. We make no assumption about the
existence, or otherwise, of coalitions, elected candidates either start their own coalition or
join an existing one.13 In the spirit of Levy (2004) and Morelli (2004), if they seek reelection,
11Experimentation with the  parameter showed that low values did not guarantee convergence therefore
a high value was employed for all experiments discussed within this paper. Beyond this relationship the
exact value had relatively little impact on the results.
12This payo is analogous to the negative innity payo received when insucient candidates stand
for election in the OS model.
13Note, whilst every representative is assigned to a coalition, given that a coalition can have a membership
of 1, this is equivalent to allowing individuals not to join a coalition.
9all members of a coalition stand on a common electoral platform. Elected representatives
are constrained to stand on their party's platform, but derive benet from being in a larger
party. The aim is to obtain as parsimonious as possible a representation of the benets of
party membership, whatever their origins, and its costs. It is argued that in context of our
computational approach this abstraction captures the key thrust of the Osborne and Tourky
(2008) model of parties as a cost-sharing technology.14 After individuals have joined coalitions
and the coalition dynamics described below have occurred, the preferred policy of the largest
coalition is implemented. Representatives prefer larger parties, since in general larger parties
are more likely to inuence the choice of policy. These assumptions are considered to
be a minimal way of representing a coordination technology for representatives.15 A key
simplifying assumption is that we don't consider post-election coalition formation. This has
been the subject of much study, and Dhillon (2005) provides an excellent review. We dene
the preferred policy of a coalition to be the mean of the ideal points of its members. The
process of coalition formation proceeds as follows. Initially each newly elected representatives
start a new coalition of which they are, at this point, the only member. All returning
representatives remain in their previous coalition, whether or not all previous members
have been re-elected. Once, all representatives belong to a coalition (possibly with a total
membership of 1)16, candidates assess whether their current coalition best represents their





j(Aj   r)j + 
(6)
Where,  is a N  1 vector of ones,  is small17, r is a coalition, #r the number of
members in that coalition, and r is that coalition's current policy. This heuristic is used to
determine individuals satisfaction with membership of a particular coalition. Representatives
14In fact, modelling explicitly a cost-sharing technology  a la Osborne and Tourky (2008), in addition
to the existing preference for larger parties, does not meaningfully alter the results presented below.
15Note, that this technology as dened does not preclude the existence of a loose or non-existent party
structure.
16Coalitions with no-members are assumed to no-longer exist.
17Specically,  is parameterized as 0:02.
10face a trade-o: membership of a larger coalition increases the likelihood that an individual's
preferences will have some inuence on the implemented policy. However, casual observation
suggests that individuals dislike belonging to the same party as those very ideologically
distant from themselves18. Individuals trade o the increased chance of being elected with
potentially sacricing the proximity to their preferred platform.
The composition of coalitions changes through a process of splitting and merging.19
These processes identify whether there are subsets of coalitions that would be better o
as separate coalitions or whether there exists pairs of parties which would be better o if
they merged. As such it is a coalition-stability concept.
In order to conduct the splitting analysis principle groupings are found within each party
using the k-means algorithm as rst proposed by Lloyd (1982) and as interpreted by Hartigan
and Wong (1979). This algorithm is widely used to identify clusters in multi-dimensional data.
In essence it searches for the allocation of observations to clusters and the means of those
clusters that minimizes the total sum of the squared distances between cluster midpoints and
the points in each cluster, across all clusters. Here, we employ it to partition each coalitions
into two groups who each consider whether it is in their interest to leave the coalition. In
particular, the j candidates are partitioned into z sets (here z = 2). This collection of sets G =









The algorithm to do this proceeds in the following steps:
1. Initially two `centers' P1 and P2 are chosen at random within the policy space.
2. Each member of the coalition identies which centre they are closest to
producing two groups G1 and G2
3. Set P1 equal to the mean of the ideal points of G1 and similarly for P2 and G2
4. Repeat from 2 until the centres no longer change.
18See Baylie and Nason (2008).
19We considered an additional process whereby individuals could unilaterally change coalition if under
the above metric it was benecial to do so. It was found that this did not eect the distribution of results.
11This algorithm is not deterministic, it is dependent on the initially chosen centres and may
nd dierent clusters each time it runs. This is advantageous for this model as it allows a more
thorough testing of the stability of each coalition as dierent groups consider seceding. Once
the groups have been identied each group must determine whether to secede. Their decision is
again based on satisfaction of individuals in the cluster with their continued membership. The
average utility of the members of each group is calculated as a combined party and as separate
coalitions. If the average utility of either group is higher after seceding then the coalition splits.
The decision to secede is a unilateral one, a group does not need permission to leave a coalition.
Similarly each coalition considers if it would be better o merging with another party
chosen at random. If the average utility of the members of both parties are greater as a
combined unit than as separate grouping the two coalitions merge into one. In this case
it being necessary that both groupings increase their utility for the merger to occur.
In both cases the average utility of members of the groups are employed in decision
making. Consequently there may be one or more members of each group which disagree with
the decision. In the long term, however, this dissatisfaction does not persist, the potential for
coalitions to further split and merge, or the citizen potentially no-longer standing, ensures
that eventually each individual is happy with their nal position.
The above process occurs after each election, each coalition (in random order) rst tests
whether it would be benecial if it splits and then tests whether it would be benecial if
it merged with one other randomly determined coalition. Once, the membership of the
coalitions has been established it is assumed that the preferences of the coalition with
the most representatives are implemented. This is an abstraction, for instance it is not
necessarily the case, as in observed democracies, that the largest coalition contains a majority
of representatives. However, the focus here is on the electoral process and not on the process
of government policy formation. All individuals in all districts therefore receive payos based
on the implemented policy of the largest party.
123.3 Equilibrium
The above process is repeated until the model converges to a stable outcome, an equilibrium.
In this model we determine equilibrium as the state in which the composition of all coalitions
is xed. This implies that in all districts the same individuals are elected, resulting in the
continuation of the same coalitions from the previous election and that no individual or group
nds it benecial to move from their current coalition. Practically the simulation is halted
after 20;000 elections in which the coalitions positions and memberships remain unchanged.
It is important to note that the outcome of the model is sensitive to the initial distribution
of preferences, which might be expected. It is also, potentially path-dependent, and potentially
sensitive to the standing decisions of candidates during the convergence process. These
are determined by the particular seed of the random number generator. As such, which of
the likely multiple equilibria the model converges to is partially stochastic. However, these
dierences tend to be small, and notably the focus is on the overall statistical properties
of the equilibria obtained for many runs for each combination of parameters, with dierent
seeds. Not the particular outcome of a given model.
To improve both the motivation and explanation of our approach, it is useful to rst
consider the relationships between `computational equilibrium' with agents who are initially
naive but then learn, and their strategic counterparts as modeled by, inter alia, Besley et
al. The model presented here is run for a large number of time steps such that there is
convergence. Individuals standing for election and party coalition composition at the end of
the experiment have reminded xed for a long period. As such the model can be viewed to
have converged to an equilibrium. As the number of agents in a given constituency becomes
large and the number of periods for which the agents behaviour is simulated also becomes
large, then the expected results become an increasingly good approximation to an analytical
equilibrium such as those obtained by OS.
Flowchart 1 shows the decisions made by citizens as the above model proceeds, whilst to
ease readability Flowchart 2 expands on the details of the party dynamics box of Flowchart 1.
As described above the model commences with the setting of the preference distributions











































Figure 1: Flowchart depicting the order of a citizen's choices within the model.
and nishes when individuals calculate their payos. If the model has not converged citizens
learn according to the rules described above and another election is called. It is worth
emphasizing that the two elements below, `citizens vote' and `candidates vote' occur together
and the results are amalgamated in order to determine those in oce. Flowchart 2 shows the
inter-coalition procedures, unlike Flowchart 1 this is not done from an individual perspective,











































































































































































































































































































153.4 Single constituency results
In this section we consider the behaviour of the single constituency model set out above.
This analysis is not the main focus of our paper as single constituency citizen candidate
models have received much analytical attention previously, notably by BS and OC. Instead
this section provides an intuition of the constituency level dynamics which will be useful
in understanding the multiple constituency model.
We investigate the model for multiple policy dimensions (k 2 f1;::;7g) and for
dierent electoral systems. We consider the election of m representatives where m 2
f1;2;3;4;5;6;10;12;15;20;24;30;40;60;120g for 100m citizens. For these simulations only,
when calculating utility the implemented policy for each citizen is that of the closest elected
representative in the policy space.20 In later sections we employ the full coalition dynamics
described in Flowchart 2 for the determination of a single ideal point. Throughout the paper
simulations were conducted with parameter values;  = 0:99  = 0:1, = 0:2 and all values
of ajk were drawn from U(0;1).21 The model is simulated until convergence. That is, the
distribution of candidates and parties has zero variance.
The key single-constituency result is that the number of candidates standing per district
in equilibrium is broadly increasing in the number of policy dimensions. Table 2 reports
results for 100 simulations, of the number of candidates standing for election in equilibrium
as the size of the electoral district, m and the number of policy dimensions, k, are varied.
The results suggest that whilst any increase in the number of candidates is smaller than
the associated standard deviations for small districts, it becomes large (compared to the
standard deviation) as the district size increases. Since, additional candidates are, in the
language of BC `spoiler candidates', the main result is perhaps to be expected: As the
policy space becomes larger, it becomes more likely that the dierence in implemented policy
occasioned by an additional candidate running is sucient to oset the cost of standing.
Furthermore, it would seem that in larger constituencies either the probability of winning
20This assumption is solely to abstract from the coalition formation and policy game so that the
constituency level dynamics are clearer.
21Dierent values of  and  were investigated, as long as the benet from election is greater than the
cost of standing there was little eect on the equilibrium obtained. If, however, the cost of standing were
high and the benet of winning low then under some circumstances the model could converge to a result
where less than m individuals were elected in a small number of simulations.
16or the change in policy position of the nearest winning candidate tends to be higher.
Figure 3.4 provides an example of these results. It can be seen that six individuals stood
for election with three being elected. The three elected representatives are interspersed
with the three non-elected standing representatives. Each citizen in the diagram votes for
its nearest standing representative. That there is a stable pattern of individuals standing
indicates that no individual can increase their utility by changing their decision to stand
as such an equilibrium is found.
Figure 3: Results of a single constituency experiment conducted in a two dimensional policy
space with 3 individual elected. Crosses represent citizens in policy space. Stalk length indicates
the number of votes a citizen received. Circle markers are elected citizens.
4 Results
This section present the main results of the paper regarding the formation of coalitions when
there are multiple electoral districts. Recall that, in the case of a single district, without
coalitions, increasing the number of candidates elected and the number of policy dimensions
both increase the number of candidates standing. But when there are potentially many
districts, and coalitions are allowed to form endogenously, that an increase in the number
of policy dimensions leads to fewer, larger, parties. Results are also presented describing
the relative policy positions of the competing coalitions, and the number of dierent types of
equilibria that the model gives rise to is analyzed. Again, whilst there are often very many
17possible equilibria in the case of a single district, without political parties, the formation
of parties markedly reduces the set of possible outcomes.
We consider a democracy in which 120 candidates are elected together representing 12;000
voters split between the C constituencies of equal size22 each returning an equal number of rep-
resentatives.23 Larger populations may be simulated, however, this does not eect the results
obtained but does dramatically increase the computational burden of the model as the running
time is proportional to the squared number of individuals. As discussed in Section 3.2 the ex-
istence of coalitions isn't assumed ex ante, but potentially emerge endogenously. The minimal
assumptions about the benets and costs of coalition membership give rise to stable electoral
coalitions - political parties. What is more, these parties seem to fulll many of the functions of
resolving ideological disagreement and, here only implicitly, providing for credible commitment
to non-preferred platforms that are suggested by Levy (2004). The results suggest that an
increase in the number of policy dimensions actually leads to fewer, larger, parties. That is, not
only do political parties provide a way of reaching agreement in multiple dimensions, but multi-
ple dimensions seem to provide, via parties, for more widespread agreement. We rst discuss in
more detail the evidence for this nding. Secondly, we provide some examples of particular out-
comes of the model. Finally, the number and form of distinct types of equilibria are discussed.
Table 3 contains results describing the mean and standard deviation of the number of
parties for each combination of district size and number of policy dimensions. The results show
that there is a negative relationship between the number of parties and the number of dimen-
sions. It would also seem that there is an immediate and large drop in the number of parties
when the number of dimensions increases from 1 to 2. Similarly, there is a notable drop when
the moving from a 2 to a 3 dimensional ideology space. But, as the number of dimensions in-
creases from 3 to 7 there is no clear relationship. This might suggest that three dimensions pro-
vides sucient exibility for parties to form, that there is little benet of further dimensions.
As Laakso and Taagepera (1979) note, many democracies are characterized by a tail
of small parties. In general, these parties have little or no impact on the democratic process.
22Relaxing the assumption of equal sized constituencies doesn't aect the results. The choice of 120
representatives is solely because it has many factors, but again this assumption is unimportant for the results.
23The analogue of the previous single-constituency model, but with coalition formation, is the case where
C = 1.
18Hence, a common approach is to dene the number of `eective parties'. We employ the









Where pi is the vote share of party i and there are n parties.24 A variety of alternatives
to the Laakso-Taagepera (LT) measure have been proposed. One common objection to
the LT measure is that it will in general suggest there are several eective parties even
when one party has an overall majority and as such only that party is `eective'. This is
less problematic for the purpose here which is to use the eective number of parties as a
summary statistic for the overall distribution of party sizes. A leading alternative is the
Banzhaf index, which measures how often a coalition can be expected to be the `swing voter'.
Kline (2009) considers the relative empirical performance of this measure, and Gelman, Katz
and Tuerlinck (2002) and Gelman, Katz and Joseph (2004) provide both a survey and a
critique of this approach.25
Table 4 contains results in terms of the eective number of parties. These conrm the
results described for the absolute number of parties, except that it is clear that additional
higher dimensions do impact the size distribution of parties if not the number. That is, the
continued decline in the number of eective parties as the number of dimensions increases
suggests that additional dimensions provide for a greater proportion of representatives to be
members of the larger parties. The size distribution of parties, and in particular the impact
of district size, will be further considered in section 5.
24The Laakso-Taagepera index is the inverse of a standard Herndahl-Hirschman index
25Another important issue is how to approach democracies employing a mixture of dierent electoral
systems. Here, we abstract from this problem and focus simply on the largest system employed, which we argue
corresponds best, although imperfectly to the simulation results. Moser and Scheiner (2004) discuss the extent
to which the coexistence of multiple electoral systems can be seen to `contaminate' outcomes within systems.
194.1 Party Size and Position
We now turn our attention to the relative `location' of political parties. As discussed
in 2 trying to predict the relative positioning of political parties has been the subject of
considerable attention at least since Downs (1957). One diculty in approaching this question
in the context of multiple policy dimensions is how to display, conceptualize, and compare
results. Our approach is to consider the positions of the each party relative to the largest
party. To do this a Gram-Schmidt scheme (as described by Golub and Van Loan (1996))
is employed to produce an orthonormalization of the set of vectors describing party positions.
We rst dene the location of the largest party to be the origin of a new coordinate system.
From here a series of M orthogonal vectors, vi for i = 1   M are calculated, corresponding
to the axis of the new coordinate space such that for the Qth largest party which has position
pQ, vi _ pQ = 0 for all i  Q and where M  N where N was the dimensionality of the original
coordinate space. We therefore produce a set of axes such that the largest party is at the
origin and each additional party requires an additional dimension to represent it, up to N.
That is, the second largest party falls on the x-axis, the third on the xy-plane etc. Note
that a further consequence is that the second party will always have a positive x-coordinate,
the third party a positive y-coordinate, but potentially negative x-coordinate,etc.
We present these results by plotting the location of parties in the rst three dimensions.
Each party is represented by a sphere with diameter proportional to the number of its members.
The left-hand plot depicts all 3 dimensions, the right-hand side plot shows the xy-plane. A
simple example is presented in Figure 4 , with just two parties competing in a 3-dimensional
policy space with 3 candidates per district. It is worth noting that the ideological discrepancy
between the parties is small, but non-zero. In general we nd very few cases where there are
large amounts of dispersion between the larger parties. It is argued that this is similar to the
case of most mature democracies, where the main parties aren't normally extremist. Figure 5
considers an example with three parties. In this example, the additional party is to the `left'
of the two larger parties on the rst dimension and also dierentiates itself on the y dimension.
Again, the ideological dierences are relatively small. The nal example displayed in Figure
6 involves ve parties. It would seem that again we don't observe extremist behaviour, rather
20the parties dierentiate themselves, particularly in the xy-plane, a little in several dimensions.
The exception is the fth party which appears relatively extreme, but in the rst 3-dimensions
at least, is about 20 percent of the total length of each dimension away from the largest party,
in each dimension. Hence, whilst a smaller, more ideologically distinct, party seems to coincide
with many democracies experience. That these dierences would seem in some sense to be
limited is considered to be both realistic and also conform to the central intuitions of the citizen
candidate model. We present a more detailed analysis of the general relationships between
district size, the number of policy dimensions, and equilibrium outcomes in the next section.
Figure 4: An example with two parties, 3 representatives per district, and 3 dimensions
Figure 5: An example with three parties, 3 representatives per district, and 3 dimensions
Figure 6: An example with ve parties, 3 representatives per district, and 3 dimensions
214.2 Equilibria Characterization
In this section, we introduce a new computational method for the identication of simulation
equilibria. Using this method, we highlight the general properties of the model rather than re-
lying on the outcomes of a few specic runs. The approach taken is to enumerate the number of
dierent equilibria and describe their general form. Whilst, as mentioned above the model for
each combination of parameters has multiple equilibria, the equilibria have two distinct sources
of variation. Firstly, dierent equilibria arise due to dierences in the preferences of citizen-
candidates as determined here by the random number seed. These dierences are expected in
any such model, computational or otherwise. The second source of variation is more minor dif-
ferences due to path dependence. For example, if there were two citizen-candidates in a partic-
ular district with extremely similar preferences, it may be that it is in the interests of both for
one but not both of them to stand. In our model, provided that they receive similar amounts
of utility from standing, which of the two stands in equilibrium is potentially path-dependent.
That is, there are two possible stable outcomes (in this model) one candidate stands with
probability 1 and one candidates stands with probability 0. But, which of the two is which
may be dependent, for example, on which is the rst to randomly stand when the other doesn't.
The minor dierences in equilibria for reasons such as this are not as interesting as larger
qualitative dierences between equilibria, which result in dierent sized or located parties.
The distinction made above is an imperfect one, whether two equilibria count as being
qualitatively dierent is in part subjective. As such, similarly to section 3.2, we employ a
statistical approach to nd the number of distinct clusters in the data. The data for each
parameter combinations, are the results of 1000 repetitions of the simulation with dierent
random seeds. As before, the results from each simulation are converted to a set of vectors in
which each vector contains the policy of a party. A Gram-Schmidt process is applied to these
vectors and the results combined with the relative party sizes to produce a single vector
for each simulation characterizing its results. A k-means clustering algorithm is applied
to the set of 1000 vectors for a range of values of k, to identify clusters of almost identical
equilibria. For each value, 1000 repetitions of the algorithm are run and the minimum value
22of k required to explain 90% of the total variance is found.26 Accordingly, we dene the
number of equilibria as, k, the number of distinct clusters identied.
It is worth noting that one consequence of the Gram-Schmidt scheme is that equilibria
that are reections or rotations of another before normalization are equivalent afterwards.
We now consider an example of how the process works: The results of three simulations
carried out in two dimensions are shown in gure 4.2. In each case there are three parties
distributed within the policy space, however, beyond this it is not possible directly to identify
any similarities between the congurations. Figures 4.2 shows the party locations after
Gram-Schmidt transformation. The largest party in each case is now located at the origin
with the second largest on the X-axis, all parties within each simulation maintain their relative
positions, however, comparison across simulation is simplied. It can now be seen that two
of the result sets are similar in the patterns of parties whilst the third diers signicantly.
The k-means algorithm for 2 clusters successfully identies these (gure 4.2). The rst being
based on the triangle and cross results whilst the second represent solely the circle results.
Figure 7: Results of three simulations, each marker is a party at the end of the simulation
with markers of the same type coming from the same simulation. Marker size corresponds
to party size
.
Figure 10 shows the results of this procedure applied to simulations of the case of 3
policy dimensions and 4 representatives per district. However, this time instead of plotting
the particular outcomes of the model we plot simultaneously the dierent equilibria of the
model, where each equilibria is represented by the mid-point of the associated cluster found
by the k-means algorithm.
There is one 2-party equilibrium, two 3-party equilibria, and a 4-party equilibrium.
26The results are not sensitive to the choice of the percentage of variance explained.
23Figure 8: Results of three simulations shown in gure 1 after the application of the
Gram-Schmidt scheme.
Figure 9: Results of three simulations shown in gure 1 after the application of the
Gram-Schmidt scheme with two equilibria represented by lled shapes found by the k means
algorithm.
Figure 10: Four of the eight equilibria in the case of 3 policy dimensions and 4 representatives
per district. In each case the largest party is at the origin.
The 2-party equilibrium, black, is straightforward to interpret and as a consequence of
the Gram-Schmidt scheme the parties are only distinguished on the x-axis. The dark-grey
and light-grey 3-party equilibria both contain a second large party, in virtually identical
locations. The dierence between the two is that the largest party is larger in the case
of the light-grey equilibrium, and the third party is located further away from the origin.
24In the case of the dark-grey equilibrium, the third party occupies a position between the
two larger parties on the x axis, and is similarly distinct on the y axis as its equivalent
in the green-equilibrium. Again, it is argued that these outcomes all are easy to interpret
intuitively. The white four-party equilibrium is perhaps less intuitive. Four way competition
in 3 dimensions is inevitably complex, but the outcome with four similarly sized parties,
two of which are located at the same point on the x-axis but distinguished on the y-axis,
with the fourth party located equidistant from the largest two parties on the x-axis but,
of course, is distinguished on the z-axis. That two similarly sized parties can be similarly
located and not-merge suggests that the model does not lead to parties merging too often,
and similarly that there is in none of the four equilibria a tail of independent representatives
suggests that similarly the parties aren't unrealistically fragmented, especially since we don't
model variations in regional politics that might give rise to such parties for other reasons.27
Table 5 reports the number of equilibria identied for each combination of parameters.
The most noticeable result is that the number of party equilibria is dramatically smaller
than the number of equilibria for a given constituency. It is clear that whilst there may
in some cases be many stable combinations of citizen-candidates standing for election in
a given district, allowing those elected to form parties signicantly alters this. One reason
for this is that party membership aects the costs and benets of standing thus reducing
the number, and changing the identity, of candidates in equilibrium. Moreover, in some
cases the formation of parties may lead to more extreme candidates receiving lower benets
of running since even if they reect preferences in a given district, the requirement that all
candidates belonging to a given party adopt the same platform may lead in equilibrium to
those with preferences closer to the national average being elected. That is, national political
concerns determine the outcome of local elections. This phenomenon is more pronounced
in larger districts and for cases with more policy dimensions. The number of equilibria at
the district level is increasing in the number of dimensions, but the converse is true at the
national level. Conditional on the number of dimensions there isn't an obvious eect of
district size at the national level, but larger districts lead to more district level equilibria. It
27An augmented algorithm in which small perturbations of party sizes were applied to identify seemingly
dierent but in eect identical equilibria was applied, but the results don't change meaningfully.
25would therefore seem that political parties provide for agreement in many policy dimensions,
but that this is either because they alter who in equilibrium runs, or because they reduce the
set of alternative compromises. In summary, whilst more dimensions lead to more distinct
equilibria in any given election, once candidates are allowed to form parties, we nd that
more dimensions leads to fewer parties, and the number of equilibria is comparatively small.
5 Comparative Politics
This section compares the size distributions of parties conditional on average district size
predicted by the model with those observed empirically. We nd that the relationship between
the eective number of parties and district size, is similar to the outcomes observed empirically.
This empirical relationship continues to be the focus of much study, with a large, and growing
literature. A classic statement is that of Lijphart (1999) whilst Gallagher and Mitchell (2005)
provides an excellent recent survey. Subject to particular attention has been the empirical
support and theoretical basis for Duverger's law - \that plurality elections give rise to a two
party system" (Duverger (1951)). Dunleavy, Diwakar and Dunleavy (2008) note that there
have been subsequent repeated restatements of Duverger's law in the face of growing exceptions
to this rule. They further argue that previous empirical ndings that lend support employ the
wrong null-hypothesis. Here, the focus is solely the number of eective parties, and we don't
presume to address either the theoretical logic for the Duvergian hypothesis (of which Morelli
(2004) is a leading example), its empirical support, or other consequences of dierent electoral
systems.28 Rather, this section attempts to show consistency between the patterns in actual
election data and those describing results from the model. The focus is on assessing the extent
to which the model gives rise to variation across political systems that is in line with what is
observed. To do so we turn rst to the empirical data and identify some simple empirical regu-
larities before arguing that the results of the model are suciently similar to lend it credibility.
Data for 248 post-1945 elections were collated from Modules 1 and 2 of the Comparative
28Other important types of variation, with more obvious normative connotations include the degree of
disproportionately (the extent to which the distribution of votes is not reected by the allocation of seats
in a legislature), or the eective threshold (the extent to which an electoral system, by design or otherwise,
precludes smaller parties from gaining seats).
26Study of Electoral Systems (2003, 2007) project and the data contained in Caramani (2000).
The combined data correspond to 38 countries, and the eective number of parties for each
election is calculated as described in Equation 8. Inspection of Figure 11) suggests that the
eective number of political parties(henceforth Ns) would seem to increase with district mag-
nitude, this hypothesis is sometimes referred to as Duverger's second or other law. Moreover,
the variation in Ns also seems to increase. However, Table 1 makes it clear that support for the
original version of Duverger's hypothesis is scant. There are more often than not more than two
eective parties in single district elections in our data. Yet, there is a dierence in outcomes
between single-district systems and others, as such there would seem some evidence for what
might be called the weak Duvergian hypothesis. That is, there is a clear qualitative change
in the distribution of eective parties between single and multi-member electoral districts.
Figure 11: Scatter Plot to show the relationship between District Magnitude and the number
of eective parties in 248 elections
However, it is also interesting that the number of eective parties, and the variation in
that number, seems to decrease at the largest district sizes. This might represent a second dis-
continuity when there is just one, national, electoral district as is the case in the Netherlands.
In summary it's claimed that the data, and the previous literature, support the following
three stylized facts:
1. The number of eective parties is (weakly) increasing in district size (excepting single
constituency systems). (Duverger's 2nd law)
272. The variation in the number of eective parties is (weakly) increasing in the size of
electoral districts (excepting single constituency systems).
3. The key qualitative change, in the number and variability of the number of eective
parties occurs between single and multi-member electoral districts. ('The Weak Duvergian
Hypothesis')
Table 1: Summary statistics
Districtsize (D) Mean (Std:Dev:) Min: Max: N
D = 1 2:43 (0:66) 1:37 4:19 52
1 < D  5 3:29 (0:51) 2:68 4:64 22
5 < D  10 4:30 (1:18) 2:30 7:27 50
10 < D  20 4:77 (1:58) 2:56 9:76 81
20 < D 4:36 (0:95) 2:94 6:80 42
We now consider how well the simulation of the citizen candidate model discussed
above can explain these stylized facts, along with other important empirical democratic
outcomes. It is argued that whilst the model indeed coincides with all three of the stylized
facts, discrepancies remain with other observed outcomes. Of course, further renement of
ideological distributions and institutional features would perhaps resolve these discrepancies.
However, precisely emulating reality is not this paper's purpose, per se, rather the focus
remains on the remarkable success of the Citizen-Candidate model.
Figure 12(a) displays kernel density plots of the number of eective parties disaggregated by
dimension for the case of 1-4 dimensions.29 It is clear that whilst the 1-dimensional case gives
rise to too many parties, and the 3 and 4 dimensional cases too few, the 2-dimensional results
are extremely similar to those obtained from the empirical data.30 This is conrmed by Figure
29The results for between 5 and 7 dimensions are similar to those of 3 and 4 dimensions.
30In all cases an Epanechnikov kernel was used, bandwidth chosen using the optimal bandwidth for the
28(a) Number of Eective Parties for Dierent
Numbers of Dimensions
(b) Comparing 2-Dimensional Simulation
and Empirical Data
Figure 12: Kernel Density Plots of Number of Eective Parties for Dierent Numbers of
Dimensions
12(b) which overlays the empirical distribution and the 2-dimensional simulation distribution.
There is more mass in the right-tail than for the empirical data, but in general it is a very
close match. It would be possible to nd the combination of results for dierent numbers
of dimensions which minimizes the dierence between the moments of the empirical and
simulation data. But, the aim is not to emulate exactly the empirical distribution but to argue
that the model gives similar results with a minimum of assumptions. It would be inappropriate
to argue based on these results that there are in reality often 2 policy dimensions, but the
similarity for the case of 2-dimensions does demonstrate the explanatory power of the model.
Do the results of the model, and the empirical data, support the three stylized facts
above? In order to answer this question regression analyses were performed on both sets of
data. The use of regression analysis for simulation results is not widely employed. However,
we argue that it is a useful way to understand the eects changes in an individual parameter
conditional on the other parameters. We report standard errors for these results, as the use
of a 100 dierent random number seeds for each combination of parameters represents both a
sample from the underlying space of potential simulation outcomes, and something analogous
to random disturbances in the conventional sense. The two sets of results are clearly not
directly comparable as the sources of variation are quite dierent. In particular, all variations
in outcomes for a given set of parameters in our simulations are due to dierences in the
random number seed chosen. In the empirical data, variation amongst similar electoral
empirical data. The simulation data were weighted to account for the uneven empirical distribution of
district size. These weights were obtained by piecewise-linear interpolation of the empirical data.
29systems can be attributed to dierences in national preference distributions, dierences in
the detail of electoral systems, as well as other national idiosyncracies. However, much can
still be gained by comparing the signs and relative magnitudes of the estimated coecients.
We begin with the empirical data. Whilst data are available on a variety of other electoral
characteristics, no attempt was made here to try to include additional variables as controls.
Rather, a simple bivariate regression was estimated.31 The results are as follows:
partiesi =  + b district sizei + i





The estimated coecient is small, however this may be, in part, a consequence of the
inuence of 19 observations (of 248) for Israel, and the Netherlands which have a single
national electoral district. Including a binary variable, large for whether district size is
greater than 100 gives the following results:
partiesi =  + b district sizei + b largei + i




district sizei   17:062
(2:580)
largei
These results suggest that an increase in district size by 1 member increases the number
of eective parties by around 0:17. This would seem more plausible, as it is better able
to explain why some single-member systems consistently give rise to less than 3.6 eective
parties.It is notable that [ large is negative.This implies that the eect of an increase in district
size is decreasing, but remains positive.32 This specication ignores the key importance of
the dierence between single-member and multi-member districts postulated in the third
stylized fact. Accordingly, a specication including an additional binary variable single
describing if a electoral system has only single-member districts, was estimated:
31All reported standard errors are robust.
32There are 17 observations for the Netherlands which has a district size of 150, and 2 for Israel which
has a district size of 120. Thus, the estimated average eect of moving from district size 10 to a large
district was of (146:84   10)  0:129   17:062 = 0:880.
30partiesi =  + b district sizei + b singlei + b largei + i




district sizei   1:118
(0:173)
single i   11:099
(2:456)
largei
Now, as expected, the coecients predict the smaller number of parties observed in
single-member systems. The coecient on district size is still small, for the reasons discussed
above, but overall the model would seem to conform better to the observed variation in
the data even though the estimated model still can't explain the large number of eective
parties observed at some elections and the R2 only increases to 36%.
The second stylized fact, that the standard deviation of the number of eective parties
is increasing in district size can be tested in a similar manner. The standard deviation of
the number of eective parties for each district size is termed sdparties.
district size=j =  + b district sizei + b singlei + b largei + i




district sizei + 0:040
(0:007)
single i   5:411
(1:010)
largei
The results suggest that, in accordance with the second stylized fact, that the variation in
the number of eective parties is increasing in district size. The positive coecient on single
implies a U-shaped relationship with single member districts and larger districts exhibiting
the most variation. To what extent this is an artefact of the available sample or a more
general pattern is unclear.
We now turn to the analysis of the simulation data. Such data has many advantages,
large numbers of observations, well-dened variables, and no unobserved confounding factors.
Given that the simulation model has two key parameters, the number of policy dimensions
and district size an obvious initial specication is simply to include each variable. The
results are obtained using the weights described above, and reported in Table 6. The results
contained in column 1 conrm the conclusions of the discussion in Section 3.2. The number
of eective parties increases with district size, and decreases with the number of policy
dimensions. However, the coecient on PR seems small. This may be for the same reason
31as in the empirical data, the inuence of the observations for 120 member districts. Column
2 includes a dummy variable, for large districts, but this doesn't meaningfully increase the
coecient on PR. The inclusion of a binary variable for single member districts, single,
reveals that it is instead the opposite phenomenon. The key dierence is between single and
multi-member districts. Indeed, the inclusion of the interaction of single and dim in column
4, dramatically increases the estimated eect of single-member districts to a reduction of
over 2:5 eective parties. The positive coecient on the interaction term, suggests that
this eect is ameliorated as the number of dimensions increases. This result is important
as it suggests that more than just altering the number of parties, the impact of ideology
is reversed in single member districts. Perhaps most important, is that these results conform
with the estimates obtained using the empirical data, as suggested by the density plots.
Overall, it would seem that the model (in general) makes predictions which conform
to the three stylized facts, and the empirical size distribution of parties. Density plots
suggest that the model, and in particular when 2 dimensions are assumed, gives remarkably
realistic outcomes. Both the empirical and simulation results suggest, in line with the third
stylized fact, that it is the single/multi-member district dichotomy that is the key source of
variation. That there is greater variability in the number of eective parties is suggested by
the importance of the interaction between the number of policy dimensions and the number
of representatives per electoral district.
6 Conclusion
The overall conclusion of the paper is that a basic Citizen Candidate framework is remarkably
well able to generate empirically and intuitively reasonable outcomes. Key to the approach
of the paper are the results of Dutta, Jackson and Breton (2001) since this makes our
results more readily comparable to those obtained assuming fully strategic agents. Section 4
demonstrates how equilibrium outcomes vary with the dimension of the policy space, and in
particular that more dimensions lead to larger parties. The novel equilibrium identication
technique employed suggests that more dimensions, are not at a national level, associated
with more equilibria, and moreover that the equilibria are plausible. The endogenous
32emergence of plausible party systems given minimal assumptions, and the consistent variation
in outcomes with dierent numbers of representatives and dimensions in higher dimensional
party equilibria further lends credibility to the results. The previous section discussed in
more detail what it can, and can not, explain in empirical terms. It is argued that overall
its performance is impressive. The comparison with the empirical data highlighted several
advantages of the computational approach. In particular, being able to compare the predicted
results with empirical data is a useful tool in evaluating the success of the model. The
similarity of results for the case of two policy dimensions suggests that comparing simulation
and empirical results can be extremely fruitful.
33Table 2: Single District Results
Number of Dimensions
PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1:74 1:89 1:77 1:69 1:57 1:63 1:79
0:58 0:60 0:57 0:61 0:56 0:61 0:56
2 2:98 3:21 3:25 3:37 3:13 3:36 3:33
0:55 0:62 0:73 0:61 0:68 0:72 0:80
3 4:12 4:53 4:70 4:65 4:84 4:88 4:90
0:71 0:72 0:76 0:85 0:88 1:01 0:97
4 5:22 5:66 5:95 6:17 6:53 6:46 6:62
0:58 0:74 0:76 1:02 1:00 1:04 0:97
5 6:39 7:02 7:49 7:56 7:91 8:07 8:22
0:78 0:91 0:94 1:06 1:17 1:26 1:14
6 7:62 8:22 8:83 9:32 9:50 9:49 10:10
0:63 0:97 1:04 0:98 1:28 1:18 1:33
8 10:19 11:22 11:47 12:20 12:61 12:84 13:16
0:90 1:11 1:26 1:26 1:28 1:61 1:55
10 12:56 13:50 14:24 14:95 15:46 15:93 16:51
0:98 1:30 1:28 1:34 1:38 1:30 1:68
12 15:20 16:23 16:89 18:33 18:53 18:95 19:41
1:18 1:66 1:42 1:45 1:52 1:62 1:73
15 18:80 19:90 20:98 21:81 22:75 23:65 24:49
1:36 1:37 1:58 1:77 2:01 1:86 2:05
20 25:15 26:79 27:92 29:04 30:22 31:54 32:32
1:51 1:75 1:92 1:80 2:20 2:02 2:36
24 29:88 31:55 33:35 34:79 36:01 37:52 38:39
1:52 1:94 1:90 2:16 2:26 2:38 2:42
30 37:91 39:71 42:09 43:49 44:86 46:66 48:26
2:07 2:40 2:18 2:40 2:62 2:70 3:00
40 50:30 52:69 54:62 58:27 59:90 61:98 64:07
2:27 2:59 2:47 2:89 2:81 3:00 3:15
60 75:89 78:87 82:36 86:11 89:23 92:37 95:50
2:72 3:14 3:10 3:64 3:49 3:71 4:06
120 151:88 157:31 163:80 169:95 176:62 182:88 189:04
4:03 4:43 3:87 4:34 4:38 5:41 5:45
PR refers to the number of representatives elected in the district. For each pair of num-
bers, the upper is the mean number of candidates and the lower is the standard deviation.
34Table 3: Absolute Number of Parties
Number of Dimensions
PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 4:36 2:3 2:25 2:13 2:19 2:13 2:11
1:09 0:48 0:44 0:34 0:42 0:34 0:31
2 5:71 2:88 2:44 2:37 2:45 2:48 2:24
0:97 0:73 0:56 0:71 1:13 1:17 0:45
3 5:71 3:73 2:66 2:53 2:9 2:96 2:9
1:35 0:95 0:65 0:81 1:48 1:99 1:9
4 5:61 4:78 2:77 2:86 3:2 3:33 3:47
1:09 0:98 0:87 1 1:69 2:21 2:44
5 6:53 4:62 2:89 3:15 3:54 3:47 3:6
1:08 0:83 0:92 1:13 1:9 2:17 2:2
6 7:27 4:61 3:26 3:18 3:6 3:47 3:72
0:94 0:99 1:17 1:1 2:36 1:82 2:46
8 8:1 4:98 3:48 3:11 3:11 3:44 3:61
1:34 1:33 1:26 0:95 1:23 1:89 2:4
10 8:14 5:31 3:72 3:23 3:14 3:17 3:75
1:38 1:46 1:61 1:17 0:97 1:63 2:49
12 7:68 5:63 3:84 3:25 3:46 3:34 3:76
1:35 1:51 1:7 1:07 0:99 1:29 2:5
15 7:72 5:59 3:62 3:16 3:53 3:3 3:55
1:55 1:75 1:59 0:93 1:61 1:31 2:11
20 7:73 5:17 3:69 3:69 3:34 3:38 3:59
1:64 1:46 1:43 1:38 1:26 1:44 2:22
24 7:32 5:03 3:65 3:41 3:47 3:42 3:64
1:43 1:63 1:53 1:17 1:61 1:64 2:51
30 7:15 4:59 3:64 3:53 3:39 3:69 3:69
1:34 1:55 1:43 1:46 1:31 1:83 2:49
40 7:24 4:7 3:5 3:42 3:46 3:76 3:15
1:51 1:4 1:24 1:24 1:54 2:14 2:11
60 6:92 4:57 3:55 3:29 3:39 3:69 3:55
1:37 1:38 1:32 1:19 1:42 2:24 2:65
120 7:21 4:16 3:57 3:29 3:19 2:8 2:59
1:38 1:36 1:59 1:05 1:68 1:53 1:83
PR refers to the number of representatives elected in the district. For each pair of num-
bers, the upper is the mean number of candidates and the lower is the standard deviation.
35Table 4: Eective Number of Parties
Number of Dimensions
PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 3:46 2:18 2:11 2:06 2:09 2:08 2:04
0:77 0:35 0:24 0:22 0:29 0:26 0:2
2 4:63 2:6 2:29 2:18 1:98 1:98 2:01
0:9 0:59 0:49 0:48 0:36 0:23 0:1
3 4:2 3:42 2:51 2:25 2:11 1:93 1:88
0:86 0:81 0:61 0:58 0:48 0:48 0:39
4 4:72 4:2 2:51 2:41 2:38 2:17 2:05
0:59 0:5 0:68 0:69 0:67 0:54 0:58
5 5:65 4:07 2:64 2:61 2:43 2:31 2:17
0:52 0:64 0:79 0:78 0:6 0:59 0:74
6 6:52 4:06 2:93 2:73 2:47 2:42 2:15
0:6 0:86 1:02 0:86 0:68 0:65 0:44
8 7:23 4:39 3:09 2:71 2:53 2:39 2:12
1:16 1:2 1 0:76 0:7 0:69 0:55
10 6:95 4:69 3:35 2:79 2:62 2:43 2:36
1:24 1:28 1:38 0:92 0:65 0:63 0:62
12 6:66 4:91 3:46 2:82 2:84 2:62 2:18
1:27 1:37 1:49 0:96 0:8 0:64 0:6
15 6:75 4:83 3:38 2:72 2:79 2:61 2:24
1:37 1:52 1:44 0:76 0:8 0:76 0:64
20 6:63 4:52 3:34 3:14 2:76 2:56 2:19
1:36 1:33 1:31 1:16 0:85 0:69 0:64
24 6:31 4:47 3:33 2:96 2:73 2:55 2:2
1:3 1:44 1:4 1:02 0:76 0:7 0:67
30 6:17 4:13 3:24 3:01 2:76 2:62 2:15
1:22 1:41 1:21 1:16 0:87 0:75 0:65
40 6:28 4:26 3:14 2:9 2:78 2:49 1:97
1:3 1:27 1:15 0:86 0:84 0:66 0:51
60 6:03 4:12 3:1 2:8 2:7 2:3 1:95
1:2 1:29 1:08 0:92 0:8 0:58 0:56
120 6:28 3:79 3:15 2:81 2:18 1:97 1:95
1:12 1:22 1:39 0:88 0:54 0:3 0:33
PR refers to the number of representatives elected in the district. For each pair of num-
bers, the upper is the mean number of candidates and the lower is the standard deviation.
36Table 5: Numbers of District and National Equilibria
Number of Dimensions
PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
22 4 3 2 3 2 2
2 5 6 5 6 5 6 6
8 9 8 6 5 4 4
3 11 15 18 14 8 9 10
22 9 8 6 3 3 4
4 18 25 28 20 28 26 31
18 17 8 8 6 4 4
5 18 38 45 46 44 47 48
25 24 6 8 4 3 5
6 25 36 49 57 52 53 55
26 21 4 7 3 4 3
8 13 30 57 50 52 55 50
41 15 6 6 5 4 4
10 11 39 42 54 58 58 55
31 19 8 7 8 3 3
12 12 35 50 56 57 54 59
37 20 4 8 8 4 4
15 18 26 48 49 53 54 50
28 16 3 10 5 4 4
20 12 31 44 55 51 49 57
24 19 5 6 4 3 3
24 14 36 40 51 50 60 51
25 13 5 6 4 4 6
30 19 23 43 48 45 52 54
27 10 5 5 5 4 3
40 7 25 48 49 51 58 55
26 15 4 5 8 4 3
60 6 34 42 46 52 49 49
25 13 5 4 5 3 3
PR refers to the number of representatives elected in the district. For each pair of
numbers, the upper is the number of district equilibria and the lower is the number
of national equilibria
37Table 6: Regression Analysis of Simulation Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pr 0:015 0:018 0:004 0:004 0:026
(0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
dim  0:437  0:439  0:448  0:554  0:367
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
large  1:857  0:576  0:642  0:763
(0:032) (0:032) (0:031) (0:037)
single  0:984  2:586  1:010
(0:004) (0:008) (0:004)
single  dim 0:394
(0:001)
pr  dim  0:006
(0:000)
Constant 4:584 4:556 5:062 5:512 4:765
(0:006) (0:006) (0:006) (0:007) (0:007)
R2 0:383 0:388 0:453 0:509 0:469
N 452064 452064 452064 452064 452064
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